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11 The Peace People
Principled and Revolutionary Non-violence in Northern 
Ireland1
Lee A. Smithey
The Peace People movement emerged in 1976 in response to a wave of 
intense violence that had grown in Northern Ireland since 1969. The 
movement quickly drew large crowds at mass rallies to protest violence, 
attracting international attention. Many of the people of Northern Ireland 
seemed ready to challenge the status quo of violence and sectarianism 
that had come to dominate everyday life. The Peace People movement, or 
the ‘Community of the Peace People’, adopted non-violent tactics and a 
non-violent ideology, challenged all forms of violence, worked to develop a 
democratic social movement organization, supported community relations 
and community development work, and called for a new unifying Northern 
Irish identity.
In the early stages of the movement, mass rallies were well-attended 
by both Catholics and Protestants. Enthusiasm ran high, and the move-
ment enjoyed substantial support both at home and abroad. Indeed, Betty 
Williams and Mairead Corrigan, two of the movement’s leaders, received 
the 1976 Nobel Peace Prize. During the second phase of the movement, 
the leaders proposed an expansive plan for grass-roots transformation of 
the region, both politically and culturally. However, two years later, the 
organization suffered from f inancial challenges, and internal dissension 
came to a head.
The energy of the movement’s launch and the scope of the Peace People 
programme were remarkable. During the f irst phase of rallies, it was as 
if the normal ethnonational fault lines became less salient in a liminal 
moment as tens of thousands of people joined together in public demonstra-
tions. Ciaran McKeown, Mairead Corrigan, and Betty Williams sought to 
provide direction and leadership in this unusual moment of collective 
emotional outpouring. Through the organization, they also worked to build 
1 Sections of this chapter also appear in Smithey (2009). The author thanks Anne Kane, 
Lester Kurtz, Rob Fairmichael, and Matt Meyer for feedback on earlier drafts of this chapter. 
Any mistakes belong to the author. The Swarthmore College Peace Collection provided access 
to the newsletters of the Peace People organization.
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further participation, a democratically elected central social movement 
organization, a network of community-based chapters, and a constructive 
programme to address contemporary social issues. All the while, they 
hitched their work to the transnational peace movement, establishing re-
lationships with prominent peace activists and organizations in the United 
States, Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East. The Peace People move-
ment constituted a signif icant challenge to political violence in a region 
wracked with bombings, assassinations, and covert and overt military 
operations. The leadership envisioned an end to violence; transformation 
of longstanding sectarian divisions; social, political, and economic reform; 
a new Northern Irish identity; and a new local political system, all achieved 
through non-violent organizing within a framework of love and respect 
for humanity. Participants were initially optimistic about the movement’s 
potential, though some observers remained guardedly pessimistic, expect-
ing the movement to quickly disappear as other grass-roots interventions 
had done. Politicians initially dismissed the movement’s potential, but 
later became frustrated with their inability to co-opt it. The Peace People 
were not following the usual sectarian and political scripts employed by 
other political actors, and this afforded a novelty that appealed to many 
otherwise disillusioned citizens.
As the editors explained in their introduction, this long-awaited volume 
brings together social movement research and scholarship on divided 
societies, encouraging us to think more deeply about how social move-
ments play important roles in what are often called ‘intractable’ identity 
conflicts and how the dynamics of such conflicts shape collective action. 
They furthermore highlight the importance of ‘actor-based approaches’ and 
the ‘contextualizing of contentious politics’. In this chapter, we examine 
a social movement with leaders who sought to overcome ethnonational 
identity barriers, rejuvenate local democracy, and further a global peace and 
justice movement. To understand its emergence and decline, it is important 
to take into account historical, political, and socio-economic conditions 
as well as movement strategy and cognitive and cultural forces. The Peace 
People constituted a direct non-violent response to violent conflict that had 
deepened ethnonational division. However, the strategic and ideological 
choices that movement leaders made to embrace non-violent methods and 
praxes proved crucial in shaping the trajectory of the movement.
The movement has been documented by McKeown (1984), Fairmichael 
(1987), and Deutsch (1977), though it has rarely been taken up in academic 
literature and usually only evokes passing reference by historians. The 
case could lend itself to a range of analyses of leadership, organizational 
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structures, transnational movement, gender studies, conflict transforma-
tion, and more. Here, I focus on the cognitive and cultural dimensions of 
the relationship between the expansive programme laid out by Williams, 
Corrigan, and McKeown (the latter two in particular) and movement 
participants.
Cultural considerations have become well-grounded in the study of social 
movements, and as I have argued elsewhere (Smithey 2009), sociologists are 
now beginning to turn their attention towards the cultural implications 
of the methods that social movement organizations employ, including the 
use of non-violent action. This is an exciting new vista of research that 
views conflict as a culturally rich form of interaction within and between 
contending parties. It is important to remember, however, that the effects 
of the framing work and strategic action decisions that movement leaders 
make are contingent on the socio-historical contexts in which movements 
emerge, the cultural terrain that both enables and constrains movements. In 
the case of the Peace People, their far-reaching non-violent agenda allowed 
them to distance themselves from the usual spiral of ethnonational conflict 
that wracked the region, but it also proved diff icult to sustain.
The Peace People represented what Nagle (in this volume) calls a 
‘transformationist’ social movement. Much as the trade union movement 
in post-accord Northern Ireland has worked to challenge sectarianism 
through appeals to class identity and a common humanity, the non-
violent programme and ideology advocated by the Peace People movement 
leadership aimed to transform the familiar sectarian terrain of Northern 
Ireland. They called for a new post-sectarian identity and new political 
systems decoupled from ethnonational divisions. Whether and how such 
a revolutionary programme of non-violent transformation could be made 
to resonate broadly in the midst of an ‘intractable’ ethnonational conflict 
constitutes the particular focus of this chapter.
Ethnonational identities often become monolithic and polarized in 
the heat and trauma of violent conflicts, and trying to soften or diversify 
collective identities is a common goal of conflict transformation efforts. 
Fortunately, collective identities are malleable, but only within limits 
(Todd 2005; Jenkins 2008; Wimmer 2008). Through framing processes, 
movement leaders can work to shift the cultural terrain of collective identi-
ties, prioritizing some over others. However, such transformative work 
is never unconstrained. It takes place within a f ield of historical experi-
ence, countervailing identities, and predispositions. Leaders with a deep 
understanding of their own in-groups often have the cultural capital to 
introduce new interpretations of where group boundaries lie. Such change 
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is incremental, and leaders can stretch their constituents too far when 
they call them to radical new interpretations of collective identities that 
outpace constituents’ abilities to reconcile the new models with those they 
have already internalized (Smithey 2011). Certainly, many factors were 
responsible for the Peace People’s downturn, including internal contention, 
funding problems, and leadership challenges (Fairmichael 1987), but this 
chapter will focus on the crucial interaction between the principled and 
revolutionary non-violence that the movement’s leaders envisioned and 
cultural and ideological preferences in Northern Ireland.2
After relaying the series of events that led to the rapid rise of the Peace 
People and the two main phases of the movement’s development, I present 
the framing of movement values and goals as an important process through 
which to observe the challenges movements face when trying to overcome 
centrifugal forces of division in the midst of a violent ethnonational conflict. 
Moreover, I argue that the leaders of the Peace People called participants 
not just to non-violent action but to extensive ideological commitments to 
principled and revolutionary non-violence. They aimed to escape the relent-
less pull of everyday violence and trauma, a broken political system, and 
polarized collective identities, but their goals proved too great a departure 
from the lived experience and habitus of many in Northern Ireland.
The Peace People
On Wednesday, 11 August 1976, one day after a car chase resulted in the 
fatal shooting of an Irish republican Army (IRA) volunteer by the British 
military and the deaths of three children, 50 women in the republican 
neighbourhoods of Andersontown and Stewartstown in Belfast protested 
republican violence by marching with baby carriages. Later that even-
ing, Mairead Corrigan,3 an aunt of the children, appeared on television, 
pleading for an end to violence. Betty Williams took action door to door 
in her neighbourhood with a petition protesting paramilitary violence. By 
the following evening (Thursday), Williams had collected 6000 signatures 
(Deutsch 1977: 6). She also scheduled a rally to take place the next day 
2 The analysis I offer draws on secondary literature about the Peace People movement, 
published f irst-hand accounts by activists and observers, and articles from The Times of London, 
and the movement newsletter, Peace by Peace (1976-1978).
3 Mairead Corrigan later married her sister’s husband after her sister’s death, and she is 
therefore referred to in more recent literature as Mairead Corrigan Maguire.
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in Andersontown. Ten to f ifteen thousand women, both Protestant and 
Catholic, attended (McKeown 1984: 142-143).
Corrigan and Williams were generally recognized as the leaders during 
the early months of the movement, and Ciaran McKeown, a journalist and 
non-violent activist, soon joined them in leading the movement for the 
next three and a half years. The f irst movement participants were almost 
exclusively women, and the press often referred to the movement as the 
‘womens’ movement’ (Walker 1976b). The leaders promptly sought to include 
all citizens, and they adopted the name, ‘Peace People’.
Phase One – Rallies
The initial phase of movement activity extended from the f irst rally in 
West Belfast on 14 August 1976 through a rally in Drogheda in the Republic 
of Ireland on 5 December 1976. At least 26 marches or rallies took place in 
Northern Ireland, Britain, and the Republic of Ireland, attracting intense 
international media attention and international f inancial and political 
support. Meanwhile, ‘Peace Committees’ or local groups (110 by one count) 
sprang up in communities as participants in the rallies organized them-
selves, and a group development programme was arranged to support local 
organizations (Deutsch 1977: 159; Fairmichael 1987: 13). The leaders secured 
a meagre central off ice in Belfast to facilitate communication between the 
various peace committees that formed and established an Assembly and 
Executive committee.
The f irst rally boasted between 10,000 and 15,000 participants (Geddes 
1976a; McKeown 1984). The rally on 21 August in Protestant East Belfast 
involved more than 20,000 people, and the rallies on Belfast’s Shankill 
Road and in Derry/Londonderry each attracted around 25,000 participants 
(Geddes 1976b; Walker 1976b). These were the largest, but other marches 
and rallies across Britain, Northern Ireland, and the Republic of Ireland 
involved thousands more participants. Fairmichael (1987: 6) estimates 
roughly that 100,000 people in Northern Ireland (approximately 6.5 per 
cent of the population) attended at least one rally. The death of the Maguire 
children had revealed collective concerns within the war-weary public 
about the continuing violence, and the rallies became catalytic rituals 
through which many in Northern Ireland sought to reframe the boundaries 
of acceptable political action and surmount deeply entrenched ethnic and 
political divisions.
The movement also attracted international media attention. Camera 
crews arrived from the United States and European countries to document 
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the movement’s activities. McKeown, Williams, and Corrigan travelled to 
the United States on at least two occasions for television interviews and 
meetings with members of Congress, including Senator Edward Kennedy. 
The Norwegian People’s Peace Prize, organized by Norwegian media, raised 
more than £200,000 for the movement by December 1976, and Corrigan and 
Williams received the 1976 Nobel Peace Prize in December 1977.
Phase Two – Community Politics
The second phase of the movement began in early January 1977 as the leader-
ship organized for the long-term maintenance of the movement and set 
out goals that would fulf il their vision of grass-roots transformation. Com-
munity peace groups had formed during the rally phase, and the leadership 
planned to coordinate them in a bid to create new ‘community politics’ and 
a shared ‘Northern Irish’ identity that would transcend polarized political 
identities (McKeown 1976: 24-25; 1984: 1, 4). In McKeown’s (1984: 189) words:
Our more immediate concern was with the low-level application of these 
ideas in the wake of ‘hot war’ […] Our purpose was to encourage such 
neighbours to take an active interest in the quality of life of their own 
streets and districts, to feel that they had friends in other communities 
busy in the same genuine patriotism, and that together they would defeat 
the deepest law of repression, ‘whatever you say, say nothing’.
To support this programme of grass-roots transformation, a non-prof it 
company and trust were set up to disburse funds to community improve-
ment programmes and small businesses. An ‘escape route’ was established 
to relocate those who wanted to defect from paramilitary organizations. 
At the same time, effort was directed towards establishing a sustainable 
organization to coordinate efforts. The strategy was designed to encour-
age a measure of self-esteem and mutual identif ication among the people 
of Northern Ireland that would eventually erode the sectarian bases for 
continuing violence and establish a social, political, and economic platform 
for self-governance.
However, over time, the movement began to experience diff iculties 
among the leadership and community groups, many of which faltered 
after the rally phase. A train was chartered to take members to a rally 
in Dublin on 18 February 1978, but by then, many had lost interest, and 
the event was not considered as successful as earlier rallies (Walker 1978). 
Concern arose over the use of funds, including the Nobel Peace Prize award 
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to Corrigan and Williams. Controversy also developed over McKeown’s 
prominence in decision-making and the organization’s f iscal strategy as 
limited funds ran short and loans were written off (Deutsch 1977; McKeown 
1984). To demonstrate their faith in the democratic structures that had 
been established and to encourage greater grass-roots ownership of the 
programme, McKeown, Corrigan, and Williams all resigned from the Execu-
tive committee in October 1978. Peter MacLachlan, formerly a prominent 
unionist politician, took over the chairmanship of the Executive.
Framing Non-violent Revolution in a Divided Society
Meaning making has become a central task of the study of social movements. 
Social movements introduce new narratives and discourses that are no less 
important than the demands they make of their opponents. They engage in 
‘framing’ battles as they seek to legitimate new policies and often lifestyles 
and delegitimize those of their opponents. To mobilize participants, move-
ment leaders develop frames and narratives about themselves and their 
opponents that resonate with potential movement members. In their early 
groundbreaking work on framing, Hunt, Benford, and Snow (1994) describe 
a ‘frame alignment process’ ‘by which social movement organizations (SMO) 
seek to bring the beliefs and attitudes of potential recruits into sync with the 
ideological frame of the movement’ (Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994; McAdam, 
McCarthy, and Zald 1988: 725). A major element of the process is the creation 
(or realignment) of in-group and out-group identities (Hunt, Benford, and 
Snow 1994: 193-194). They stress that this process of identity formation is 
ongoing and that SMOs must be persistent if they hope to succeed.
However, framing contests take place in pre-existing f ields of collective 
identities, preferences, and interests. The alignment of movement goals with 
pre-existing narratives, discourses, and identities is a particularly important 
challenge (Woehrle, Coy, and Maney 2008). Eyerman and Jamison (1991: 56-
57) stress the compatibility of the movement’s message with contemporary 
norms and cultural expectations, or the ‘willingness and capacity of the 
entire social formation to absorb, incorporate, or reject the “message” of 
the movement’.
Cognitive dissonance can set in when a movement’s ideological basis or 
praxis4 conflicts with participants’ pre-existing cognitions. As a movement’s 
4 Eyerman and Jamison (1991: 46) def ine praxis as a ‘“packages of ideas” or clusters of issues, 
or, perhaps most ambitiously, as organizational ideologies or prof iles’.
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ideology and frames must compete in a cultural and political space against 
other competing ideologies and norms, we should explore successes and 
failures in these battles of ideas. The relationship between movement praxis 
and the level of integration among movement participants also becomes 
particularly relevant when studying the Peace People’s efforts to reach their 
stated goals of a radical new democracy in a highly segregated society. I 
focus in this chapter on a particular set of non-violent praxes, principled 
and revolutionary non-violence, that served as central ideologies in the 
Peace People movement.
Principled Non-violence
‘Principled non-violence’ refers to an ideology or system of ideas and beliefs 
that accompany and legitimate the use of non-violent civil resistance while 
calling adherents to repudiate violence and encourage pre-figurative collec-
tive action. A brief look at several central elements of Gandhi’s non-violent 
philosophy help illuminate the basics of principled non-violence (Gandhi 
1962, 1967, 1986; Kurtz 2008). For principled activists, non-violence:
– is spiritual or metaphysical;
– is ethically or morally superior to the use of violence;
– should be practiced as a lifestyle;
– can produce new societal paradigms;
– separates the doer (opponent) from their deeds (oppression);
– assumes a oneness among humans.
Principled non-violence is both a strategy and a belief system. Adherents 
to principled non-violence reject the use of violence on moral and ethi-
cal grounds and insist that violence is ultimately more destructive than 
productive. Thus, means and ends become inseparable. Those who advocate 
principled non-violence emphasis its moral and strategic superiority for 
achieving the interests of their group and, ultimately, even their opponents.
Revolutionary Non-violence
The Peace People leadership also called for revolutionary non-violence, a 
praxis that shares many of the fundamentals of strategic non-violent action 
and principled non-violence.5 According to the peace activist, scholar, and 
5 The now familiar distinction between strategic and principled nonviolence should not 
imply that non-violent revolutionaries are without strategy or principles. 
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educator Matt Meyer, ‘Revolutionary nonviolence emphasizes unity among 
radicals and proposes a militant non-violent praxis based on revolution-
ary transformation and mass civil resistance’.6 Meyer (2014) asserts that 
revolutionary non-violence requires careful introspection of structural 
violence, colonial histories, and power structures. And while it might be 
argued that the Peace People side-stepped issues of colonial history in 
Ireland, the leadership felt that an end to violence would be necessary but 
not suff icient. A lasting peace would require root-and-branch transforma-
tion of politics, economics, and social relations through mass organizing 
and grass-roots action.
The organization’s newsletter reveals consistent efforts to express soli-
darity with contemporary activists and movements often associated with 
revolutionary non-violence, such as the Plowshares movement, Movement 
for a New Society, advocates of Catholic liberation theology, and non-violent 
revolutionaries, such as the Berrigan Brothers and Steve Biko in South 
Africa (Meyer 2014). Many of the Peace People were inclined to participate 
in local social work, community development activities, or mass rallies, 
but a revolutionary programme that sought to address global economic 
disparities or authoritarianism in other countries proved elusive and even 
offensive to some.
The Peace People and Principled Non-violence
From the beginning, the main leaders embraced a radical non-violent 
ideology. Betty Williams’ initial efforts gathering signatures for a petition 
protesting the death of the Maguire children expressed a simple desire for 
an end to violence and the dissolution of the IRA. She declared, ‘After such 
a tragedy, we must and will have peace!’ (Deutsch 1977: 6). Mairead Corrigan 
responded boldly to threats by the IRA: ‘We realize that before this is finished 
people may have to die for peace in Northern Ireland. But this only makes 
us more determined than ever, as none of us can think of a better cause to 
have to die for’ (Walker 1976a). Ciaran McKeown soon joined Williams and 
Corrigan and brought a new sophistication to the leadership’s non-violent 
vision. After the rallies subsided, McKeown intended for the movement to 
generate pressure through ‘community politics’ and new power-sharing 
arrangements, but he also envisioned changes in hearts and minds.
6 https://web.archive.org/web/20150808153426/http://beautifultrouble.org/theor y/
revolutionary-nonviolence/. 
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Williams and Corrigan remained the central spokespeople, but McKeown 
(1976) penned the Peace People Declaration and a pamphlet entitled The 
Price of Peace, in which he framed the movement’s potential and long-term 
goals. It is in McKeown’s writings that one often f inds calls to principled 
non-violence, such as those enumerated in the Gandhian template above.
Use of Spiritual, Metaphysical, or Religious Tenets
Northern Ireland is a highly religious region within Europe, and the three 
primary leaders often drew on Christian theology and practice, especially 
Corrigan and McKeown. They spoke in familiar religious terms, and they 
used theological principles to emphasize the importance of non-violence 
and the oneness of humanity. McKeown (1976: 14) wrote, ‘If you believe in 
God, you will already know your own value as a divinely created person with 
the possibility of a divine destiny […] you will know that you must have an 
equal respect and love for his other creatures’. Mairead Corrigan, a devout 
Catholic, often drew on her faith and spoke of love and forgiveness as she 
did in her regular column in the movement newsletter, Peace by Peace.
Non-violence Is Morally Superior
McKeown highlighted the virtue of non-violence and emphasized the 
need for courage to carry out principled non-violence: ‘Both logically and 
emotionally, it takes far more courage to be prepared to die, but never to 
kill, than it takes to be prepared to kill and take your chance on dying’ 
(1976: 3). Courage emerges as a recurring virtue that Williams, Corrigan, 
and McKeown associated with non-violence. In their Noble Peace Prize 
lecture, Williams and Corrigan (1977) contrasted global militarism and 
military expenditures with courageous non-violence:
We know that this insane and immoral imbalance of priorities cannot be 
changed overnight: we also know that it will not be changed without the 
greatest struggle […] And that struggle must be all the greater because 
it has to be an unarmed, a nonviolent struggle, and requires more cour-
age and more persistence than the courage to squeeze triggers or press 
murderous buttons.
In this excerpt, Williams and Corrigan frame non-violent action as cou-
rageous (and diff icult) and imply by contrast that violence is easy and 
cowardly.
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Non-violence as a Lifestyle
Applying non-violent philosophy in all areas of one’s life coincided with 
the movement’s goal of transforming society from the bottom up. Whether 
dealing with domestic conflicts in the home (McKeown 1976: 18) or work-
ing to build the movement, one’s commitment to non-violence required 
continuous discipline. According to McKeown (1976: 3), ‘the genuine pacifist 
is engaged in a battle every day of his life’. In the 20 May 1977 issue of the 
movement’s newspaper, nearly a full page was dedicated to an article about 
the Community of the Ark (L’Arche), a non-violent community in France, 
where,
To become the instrument of non-violence and unity, intelligence and 
affections must be constantly renewed and animated by Truth and Living 
Love […] This is why the members of the non-violent community must 
seek together every day the spiritual strength in which they may f ind 
comfort, surmount their oppositions and live in a practical unity which 
reaches out to every person, even an adversary. (_.1977: 5)
While the Community of the Peace People did not develop communal 
living, the basic principle of daily commitment was consonant with the 
bottom-up transformation of Northern Ireland that lay at the heart of the 
leadership’s programme.
New Societal Paradigms
Advocates of principled non-violence focus not only on the means of non-
violent struggle but also on non-violent ends of more peaceful and just 
economic, political, and social relationships. McKeown criticized Northern 
Ireland’s limited ‘party-political’ system and its inability to provide a 
solution to the Troubles. He felt any sustainable peace process would be 
produced from the grass roots. Only by transforming sectarian impulses at 
the individual and community level could a consensus be built. McKeown 
(1976) also felt the energy of the movement provided an opportunity to 
create an entirely new and unprecedented political system, an ‘optimum’ 
democracy (McKeown 1976: 27). Moreover, McKeown’s transformationist vi-
sion called for a revolutionary new society distinguished by ‘peace culture’:
Those with a deep interest in peace beyond a mere end to violence 
will have a special role in helping to create a ‘peace culture’ which will 
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compete with and f inally replace the received and meekly accepted 
cultural tradition with its violent tones, undertones and overtones. In 
short, we are attempting nothing less than the creation of a new civiliza-
tion (1976: 28).
Campaigns were proposed to reform policies, such as police interrogation 
practices and Diplock courts, and to institute corrective policies, such as 
emergency status for prisoners charged under the Emergency Provisions 
Act. Together, they reflected the call for a new vision of a just future.
Oneness of Humanity and Separating the Doer from the Deed
Principled non-violence is often underpinned by a belief in a fundamental 
equivalence (and sometimes even metaphysical unity) of all humans, chal-
lenging processes of dehumanization that legitimate violence. McKeown 
touched on the oneness of humanity in his recognition of divinity in all 
humans, but more often, he emphasized Western concepts of individual 
liberties that all people share. Corrigan, writing in the Peace by Peace 
newspaper, declared that in the afterlife, ‘I will be judged as a child of the 
universe and on my capacity to love all men of all nations’ (Corrigan 1978: 3).
A universalist position on the unity of all humans that considers 
humanity fundamentally good requires a way to distinguish humanity 
from destructive human behaviour and provide a pathway to atonement. 
McKeown and his successor as chairman of the Peace People Executive, 
Peter McLachlan, agreed that an authentic peace process, and ultimately 
reconciliation, would require involving ex-combatants from all sides 
and differentiating perpetrators from their violent actions in order to 
incorporate them into a new emerging society. As editor of Peace by Peace, 
McKeown published pieces by Gusty Spence, an imprisoned leader of the 
loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force paramilitary, and he foresaw a time when 
those, like Spence who had previously been involved in violence, should be 
released from prison (McKeown 1984: 188).
Aligning Principled and Revolutionary Non-violence with 
Northern Ireland Culture
Why did the movement decline? A complete answer lies beyond the scope 
of this chapter. I propose, as only one factor, that many who participated 
in the rally phase could not fully embrace the revolutionary scope of the 
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programme formulated by the movement’s leadership. McKeown’s philoso-
phy of non-violence constituted not only a set of strategies for achieving a 
conventional political end. He proposed a redefinition of the entire political 
structure and human relations in Northern Ireland.
Northern Ireland’s unique historical context, including its divided 
political system and the traumatized collective psyche of the region, gen-
erated both opportunities and constraints for the movement. According 
to Fairmichael (1987: 3), a genuine political vacuum was left in the wake 
of politicians’ failures to establish a power-sharing government in 1973. 
Moreover, the deaths of the Maguire children further dramatized the daily 
violence of the Troubles, evoking a public sense of outrage. Deutsch (1977), 
Fairmichael (1987), McKeown (1976: 11), and McKeown (1984) each noted a 
war-weariness or demoralization hanging over the region that reached a 
critical mass as the Peace People emerged (Deutsch 1977: 24). Unemploy-
ment had risen to record levels, and rates of violent deaths and injuries had 
risen to levels not seen since 1972 (Fairmichael 1987). As McKeown (1984: 
139) describes, ‘Violence was consuming itself, it seemed, and could beget no 
more violence […] A volcano working up from the depths of the communal 
soul was looking for an outlet’. The bold and unconventional responses of 
Betty Williams and Mairead Corrigan provided an outlet for a collective 
frustration that had been building.
Even though Northern Ireland’s troubled past provided an impetus 
for the Peace People, the context in which a movement emerges can also 
constrain it. Herein, one f inds an important paradox in the emergence and 
maintenance of the Peace People. The non-violent nature of the movement 
made it appealing to the war-weary citizens of Northern Ireland. Yet, in 
the long run, the extensive commitment to principled and revolutionary 
non-violence proved unsustainable, because the Peace People’s leaders were 
unable to align their non-violent praxis with the culture and experience of 
the people of Northern Ireland.
As Eyerman and Jamison (1991) point out, the ability of movement intel-
lectuals to convey a movement’s ideological foundation is important to the 
movement’s capacity to establish and maintain itself. More importantly, 
a movement’s ideology only has signif icant meaning when the meaning 
is collectively attributed or assigned (Kane 2011). Structural and cultural 
conditions hindered widespread adoption of an elaborate and radical 
programme of revolutionary non-violence and political transformation in 
Northern Ireland.
Ethnonational identities in Northern Ireland constitute important ‘cross-
cutting solidarities’ that can inhibit movement (McAdam, McCarthy, and 
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Zald 1988), and the Peace People drew support from a divided constituency 
harbouring divided loyalties. Consequently, the Peace People’s ideology 
tended to conflict with pervasive local configurations of identity f ields. 
Among Peace People participants, ethnonational loyalties varied in inten-
sity, but they persisted. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1988: 704) argue that 
the greater the number and strength of such cross-cutting ties, the less likely 
a social movement will be able to emerge. As McAdam (1982: 49) argued 
when he introduced micro-mobilization processes to the study of social 
movements, ‘It is not simply the extent and speed with which insurgency 
is spread but the very cognitions on which it depends that are conditioned 
by the strength of integrative ties within the movement’s mass base’. It is 
equally true that once a social movement emerges, cross-cutting solidari-
ties may also serve to precipitate its decline, especially when movement 
participants are already culturally predisposed to segregation (Bardon 1992: 
727; Gamson 1995). The principled and revolutionary non-violent ideology 
of the Peace People became problematic as their leaders sought to redefine 
boundaries in Northern Ireland in radically egalitarian ways.
There are surely several reasons for the waning local support and the 
eventual decline of the Peace People during the movement’s second phase. 
These include frayed relationships, f inancial problems, and misconceptions 
regarding the leadership’s international roles (Fairmichael 1987; Walker 
1978).7 However, events during the second phase and appraisals by ob-
servers and participants indicate that the goals of the movement, derived 
from principled and revolutionary non-violence, proved unacceptable to 
a signif icant portion of the movement’s potential supporters. Movement 
participants were constantly confronted with the incongruity between their 
experience and the off icial non-violent vision for the movement. Richard 
Deutsch (1977: 175), who observed and documented the movement, offers 
this ‘critical evaluation’:
In many ways, the Northern Irish were not ready for the ideas of the Peace 
People. They were astonished by the plans, the scope of the program and 
of the thinking behind it. They must make a mental adjustment. They 
wanted peace, almost an immediate peace, a ‘natural’ peace without 
problems and without sacrif ices. Then along came the Peace People and 
overwhelmed them with new thoughts and grandiose projects. Instead of 
bringing ready-made solutions, they asked for an extra effort, a collective 
7 Further scholarly historiography of the movement could expand on Fairmichael’s (1987) 
investigation and serve to elevate these factors in subsequent analyses.
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effort and, above all, a personal effort. And that, no doubt, is why the 
movement has met with so much resistance.
McKeown also found that the commitment of the movement’s leaders to a 
radical philosophy of non-violence proved problematic:
By and large, in our early declarations of purpose, we were benignly 
dismissed as naive idealists, who might be forgiven such aberrations as 
nonviolence, in favour of the excellent promotional job we were otherwise 
doing. It would be much later, as it became clearer that nonviolence was 
the be-all and end-all of our commitment, that benign patronisation 
would give way more generally to irate opposition. (McKeown 1984: 177)
A couple of Ciaran McKeown’s proposals for Peace People action demon-
strate internal disconnects between what Fairmichael (1987: 43) character-
izes as the ‘prophetic’ (or revolutionary) project of non-violence backed by 
the leaders and the ‘quieter project work’ on which others wanted to focus.
First, contention over the treatment of prisoners held under the terms 
of the Emergency Provisions Act presented a signif icant stumbling block. 
Secretary of State Merlyn Rees withdrew ‘special category status’ for 
prisoners convicted of crimes after 1 March 1976. Republican prisoners 
protested this reversal, f irst by refusing to wear prison uniforms and then 
by refusing to use the sanitary facilities and smearing their own faeces 
on the walls of their cells. McKeown proposed that the issue be resolved 
by establishing an ‘emergency status’ for prisoners charged under the 
Emergency Act. Thus, those with extensive sentences established under 
the emergency situation would not be subject to the sentences indefinitely 
once the emergency ended. For McKeown (1984: 250), the prison issue was a 
crucial one on which the trajectory of the conflict could depend. It ‘was the 
very touchstone of our seriousness as a peace movement seeking to work at 
the heart of the conflict’. The Peace People Assembly backed the proposal 
during its conference in October 1978, but for many Peace People, focusing 
on the politically charged prison issues amounted to ‘becoming political’ 
and risked upsetting the reconciliation work with which they were more 
comfortable. Others simply could not stomach extending any sort of relief 
to those they considered convicted terrorists (? 1978: 8).
Others found the international focus of McKeown, Williams, and Corrigan 
too ambitious or distracting. McKeown (1984: 221-224), in particular, felt that 
Peace People groups should be actively involved in solidary relationships 
with other peace groups around the world as an appropriate expression of 
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the unity of humanity. ‘It seemed to me that we could not seriously tackle 
Northern Ireland’s problems with the appropriate non-violent strategy and 
determination, if we did not have a constant, relentless appreciation that 
every human life is sacred: and that understanding dictated an immediate 
and active concern about “Third World” conditions’ (1984: 223) (cf. Lakey 
1973: 75-76). Hazel Senior of the Holywood Peace Group described the dis-
connect over international solidarity in an interview with Rob Fairmichael 
(1987: 39):
Some of our people are very much if I may use the phrase, into nonviolence, 
and this means that perhaps they are just as involved in the non-violent 
aspect worldwide. For others I feel that they’re interested in peace in 
Northern Ireland and that nonviolence might come into their vocabulary 
equally. I think in some ways people regard it as an academic thing.
These sorts of disputes represent a problem with framing and collective 
attribution, an inability of movement intellectuals to reconcile their radical 
non-violent philosophy with participants’ understandings of reality. After 
all, framing is only one part of an interactive process of meaning mak-
ing within social movements as participants experience, interpret, and 
internalize discourses over time from within their own socio-economic, 
cultural, and historical contexts (Kane 2011). As the Peace People emerged 
in a flash of weary frustration at the height of the Troubles and the three 
main leaders assumed such prominent roles, there was less opportunity for 
a more organic development of the movement’s claims.
Conclusion
Collective identities play central roles in both ethnonational conflicts and 
social movements. Conflict, whether violent or non-violent, can deepen 
and polarize ethnonational boundaries, but some movements call for 
realignments of identities and social structures (see Nagle, in this volume). 
Nevertheless, each social movement emerges within its own political and 
historical context, and its praxis competes with other contradictory and 
established identities and ideological commitments. Careful framing can 
take advantage of the malleable nature of identities and introduce new 
models of identif ication that rearrange or transcend normal boundaries. 
However, new models introduced in moments of social movement can also 
prove too radical. To the extent that leaders’ goals contradict or challenge 
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prevailing identities and habitus, social movement organizations will f ind 
recruiting and retaining participants challenging.
The Peace People in Northern Ireland emerged in a society marked by 
deep social, political, cultural, and psychological divisions. Many citizens 
opened to new ideas of reconciliation and social change during the rally 
phase of the movement. McKeown, Corrigan, and Williams envisioned 
an unprecedented, totally inclusive, and non-violent society, a radical de-
mocracy that would arise from individuals deeply committed to principled 
non-violence and aligned with a global network of solidary movements, 
but Northern Ireland presented a diff icult environment within which to 
establish and maintain support for a movement based on a combination 
of principled and revolutionary non-violence, especially once the efferves-
cence of the early rallies faded. The scope of the leaders’ goals exceeded the 
immediate desire for an end to violence and required a reconfiguration of 
world views extensive enough that their programme could not maintain 
broad support. For some, the immediacy of the Troubles trumped inter-
national solidarity, for others their views on justice precluded the call to 
reintegrate ex-combatants, and still others could not reconcile the poles of 
principled and revolutionary non-violence when called on to intervene and 
restructure the political system. These disconnects on matters of policy 
signal a deeper problem in meaning making at the intersection of framing 
and collective attribution.
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